# Round 3 disposition

Input SHA-256: 1bc49a15da7496df0976de0281bac762abaca9a25a6b2f5feb256cf4c49e3e9c.
Both models completed with exit 0, nonempty reports, and empty stderr.

## Opus

- F1 accepted: release hardening, controlled installation/update paths, live XPC code validity, and same-user injection tests.
- F2 accepted: one-time scope is a captured connection attempt or fixed set; later attempts require new authority. Test repeated connections.
- F3 accepted: allow-once explicitly included in permit, confinement, replay, and cross-purpose rejection tests.
- F4 clarified: a validated compatibility contract may cover a version range; an update does not automatically disable support. Truly unknown semantics use the existing read-only notification/manual route. Biometrics cannot repair unknown semantics. Any broader fallback requires concrete evidence and consultation.
- F5 resolved with user context: the phone's lock screen already prevents access to this request UI. No separate lock-screen workflow or extra app-unlock step. Add overlay/touch protections and test the existing navigation boundary.
- F6 accepted: separate authority requests from phone decisions and verify enrolled key purpose independently of message assertions.
- F7 accepted: consume before any scope mutation; all mutation and dispatch occur under one permit. Interrupted mutation is unknown and refresh identifies a potentially modified default.
- U1 resolved as a feasibility goal selected by the user: preserve pairing after biometric changes where practical. Validate supported key policy and safe continuity, retain pairing metadata, and fall back to independently authenticated remote-admin key recovery. A decision key cannot elevate itself by rebinding biometric authority. Full re-pairing is a last resort if the pairing record cannot be trusted.
- U2/U3 are covered by F4/F5. No new extra-biometric fallback was selected.

## Kimi

- Finding 1 accepted: multiple phones per Mac/account; fan out to each, consume once, reconcile all; explicit add versus replacement with old-phone revocation.
- Finding 2 accepted: size budgets based on supported platform captures, no truncation, and a distinct Request too large result.
- Finding 3 accepted: verified liveness check at the execution boundary; known no-child outcome differs from started or uncertain execution. Do not claim liveness checks eliminate all races.
- The assertion that every already-defined feasibility gate blocks plan convergence is rejected. A complete plan can specify evidence and failure/consultation paths without performing its future implementation. Planning defects and currently unselected UX policies still block convergence.

## User choices

- Cancel, deny-once, and Little Snitch allow-once require no biometrics.
- The default Forever and all reusable rules require biometrics, including timed/session rules.
- The normal request UI is unavailable while the phone is locked; no separate lock-screen use case is requested.
- Preserve pairing after biometric changes where possible, within reason.

No runtime feasibility claim is made. The next round reviews the revised plan and these dispositions.