# Round 12 review — GLM (sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7)

**Input:** revision 18 excerpts as provided. Prior disposition (round 11) reviewed: its four corrections are reflected in the in-scope text — section 6 now separates routing control, update scheduling, and gateway control as distinct purposes, and the decision key's authority exclusions remain intact. The routing/gateway/audit/outbox details live in sections 14/17 and are out of scope here.

**Checks performed:**

- Biometric policy consistency (§1 table ↔ §6 scope enforcement ↔ §7 key requirements): allow-once/deny-once/decline/cancel without biometrics, every reusable rule (including session/timed and Deny Forever) with biometrics, both verifiers deriving key class from retained semantics rather than message assertions. Consistent; no bypass path in scope.
- Decision-key confinement (§6): purpose separation, exclusions (rules, commands, 1Password, credential release, enrollment), and coverage of deny-once/target-cancel via the cancellation-authority paragraph. No authority gap found.
- Enrollment/revocation boundary (§5): admin authorization is verified on the Mac (remote SSH/screen-sharing satisfies this without physical presence), network messages cannot enroll/replace/revoke, revocation serialized with decision consumption, last-phone cancellation only when no implemented approval surface remains, native dialogs unaffected. Consistent with §1 and §6.
- Pairing preservation across biometric invalidation (§5): decision key continues only for one-time actions, never replaces biometric/credential keys, recovery via remote-administrator path within the retained pairing record. No forced re-pairing; feasibility gate correctly framed.
- State machine and race handling (§6): consumption persisted before side effects, terminal states only when undispatched, ledger-arrival wins across phones, late/stale approvals rejected, unknown terminal for retry, permit invalidation and bounded acknowledgments for adapter crashes. No ordering defect found.
- Size limits and encoding (§6): distinct "Request too large" outcome, no truncation at any stage, no signed shell strings, expiry under Mac monotonic clock with skew not extending authority. Sound.
- Section 7: BIOMETRIC_STRONG with no grace period, immutable request selection across lifecycle transitions, no lock-screen surface, no notification-action bypass, credential release bound to paired adapter and exact request, one-biometric gate with explicit consultation path. No UX regression or consent-binding defect found.

No correction considered would improve security without either restating existing text or worsening the confirmed UX (e.g., adding biometrics to one-time decisions or physical presence to enrollment), so none is proposed.

**NO SUBSTANTIVE FINDINGS**