# Round 10 disposition

Input: revision 16, SHA-256 `239d5993e339c249a63d621b0e69e3897c66fffac15ecb8fbabffab4027d2ff6`.

K3 completed its full-plan review with no substantive findings. All three GLM follow-up scopes were clean, with unchanged prior coverage retained by exact comparison. Opus returned one low–medium finding.

## Correction in revision 17

**Opus 1: Cloudflare management credential custody and authority. Accepted.**

Section 16 now names a separate signed administrative setup controller. Its management token uses root-only custody, outside transport and interactive-user access. Management calls require the existing administrator-authorized lifecycle flow. Phone, push, and transport credentials cannot invoke them.

The controller has no network listener and offers only typed, resource-bound operations. It cannot act as a generic API proxy or expose arbitrary local ingress. Actual Cloudflare scoping limits are a feasibility obligation; broader permissions need disclosed setup approval. Recurring credential entry or authorization remains a consultation gate.

A credential table distinguishes cloud management, tunnel runtime, push submission, phone Access, and server-side provider credentials. Gateway administration remains with its operator. The component inventory and signed release manifest now include the setup controller under existing placement and generation rules.

No normal approval step, biometric, pairing reset, or remote-functionality restriction was added.