# Round 1 disposition (in progress)

Plan input SHA-256: 054111627e474840b68c35b19b2a068ad589f898d8c195325560249de403fd9d.
Opus review: claude-code/claude-opus-5-5, exit 0, substantive findings.
Kimi review: kimi-code/k3-256k, running.

## Opus findings

- F1: accept. Bind the credential-receiving adapter identity to code-signing-restricted non-exportable keys. The root authority authenticates adapter requests and owns consumption records. Test same-user impersonation and credential interception.
- F2: accept option (a). Provide a dedicated unprivileged background transport for commands before GUI login. Keep AX adapters scoped to GUI sessions. Do not impose a GUI-login prerequisite on sudo.
- F3: accept. Show verified requester identity, distinguish frontend identity from upstream caller attribution, and label unverified rationale.
- F4: accept. Use transport authentication for denial/status; biometric signatures grant positive authority only. Constrain cancellation authority.
- F5: accept. Local authorization means authorization verified on the Mac, including independently authenticated remote administrator sessions. Document remote recovery and credential re-entry.
- F6: accept integration tests and timeout configuration, plus explicit requester-exited feedback. No detached-by-default behavior or shorter response window.
- F7: accept. Require a monotonic clock that includes sleep; test sleep beyond expiry.
- F8: accept. Phone computes the digest from the exact canonical payload it renders. Every execution authority recomputes against its retained original.

These corrections preserve the normal interaction count and remote capabilities. No UX-reducing alternative is selected.

## Kimi findings and final round status

Kimi review completed with exit 0 and substantive findings.

- Finding 1: accept; consolidated with Opus F1 key custody and request-authority correction.
- Finding 2: accept; apply escaping and field/value separation to every rendered UI field.
- Finding 3: clarify enrollment keys as per (Mac, account) tuple. The original signed account field already distinguished accounts cryptographically, so shared keys alone did not make signatures indistinguishable. Explicit key scoping simplifies enrollment and revocation without changing the approval UX.

All proposed corrections were applied in revision 2. No UX-reducing alternatives were selected. Both round-1 reviewers used the same input hash.